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Summary findings
After being excluded from world capital markets during  by substantial outflows and an outright balance of
the debt crisis, many developing countries have  payments crisis.
experienced large capital inflows in the past five years.  What are the implications for policy in recipient
The challenges these inflows pose for domestic policy  countries? Briefly:
have generated a substantial literature.  *  The receipt of capital inflows may strengthen the
Fernandez-Arias and Montiel review and extend that  case for removing macroeconomic distortions, either
literature. They characterize the new inflows, assess their  because such inflows aggravate the cost of such
causes and likelihood of sustainability, analyze the policy  distortions or because they ease the constraints that
issues they raise, and evaluate possible policy responses.  originally motivated their adoption.
Their conclusions tie desirable policy responses to  *  While direct intervention with capital inflows may
characteristics of both the flows themselves and to those  not be feasible (because controls may be easily evaded),
of the recipient economy.  controls may sometimes be a second-best policy.
Regarding the forces driving the current episode, they  *  To the extent  that capital inflows are permitted  to
conclude:  materialize, the desirability of foreign exchange
*  Generally, the role of foreign interest rates as a  intervention depends on what is required for
"push" factor driving capital inflows and determining  macroeconomic stability.
their magnitude has been well-established.  *  Sterilized foreign exchange intervention to prevent
*  On the other hand, country creditworthiness has  overstimulation of demand with a fixed exchange rate
helped determine both the timing and destination of the  may not be feasible or effective. A commensurate
new capital flows.  reduction in the money multiplier, achieved by
* Even if creditworthiness is maintained, the early  increasing reserve requirements, may also have limited
level of inflows is unlikely to be sustained. The pace of  effects. The effectiveness of both measures depends on
reduction in flows to countries that have been receiving  the structure of the domestic financial system.
them since the early 1990s depends on the path of  *  If domestic monetary expansion is not avoided, or if
foreign interest rates and the role of stock adjustment.  an expansionary  financial stimulus is transmitted outside
But a loss of creditworthiness caused by a deterioration  the banking system, the stabilization of total demand will
in domestic policy would stop inflows quickly and,  require fiscal contraction.
depending on the circumstances, inflows may be replaced
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After being excluded  from world capital markets during the debt crisis, a substantial number
of developing  countries have experienced  large capital inflows during the past five years.  This paper
critically  reviews and extends the substantial literature generated by the domestic policy challenges
posed by these inflows, describing the characteristics of the new inflows, assessing their causes and
likely  sustainability,  analyzing  the policy issues they raise, and evaluating potential policy responses.
While regaining access to capital markets constitutes a welcome relief from the constraints
of credit rationing, it also poses structural and macroeconomic policy problems. In contrast to the
inflow episode leading to the debt crisis, absorption of the current inflows by the private sector
ensures that the market test is passed. However, the potential roles of a variety of distortions implies
that  a  laissez-faire policy stance may not be warranted on microeconomic grounds.  Moreover,
though capital inflows may represent the outcome  of a favorable external shock, their implications
for macroeconomic stability may call for a policy response on these grounds as well.
The analysis  indicates  that, in the aggregate,  country creditworthiness  has played an important
role in determining  both the timing and geographic destination of the new capital flows and that the
role of foreign interest rates as a "push" factor driving capital inflows is well established.  Less is
known about the importance of external structural factors and the relative weights to be attached to
foreign  factors and specific types of domestic factors in individual countries, which is crucial for the
design of policies.
Concerning  sustainability, loss of creditworthiness may lead to  an outright  balance of
payments crisis.  According to the creditworthiness index used in this paper, for most countries the
risk of such an extreme form of hard landing  lies in domestic shocks rather in systemic factors.  Even
if creditworthiness is retained, however, the early level of inflows is unlikely to be sustained.  Apart
from the gradual deterioration of external factors forecasted in this paper, this is because the nature
of stock adjustment would make the level of inflows diminish over time, and perhaps lead to a hard
landing in case of deterioration, even with stable external financial conditions.  The key gap in
knowledge  here for assessing the possibility of a hard landing is how large the temporary  stock
adjustment  component of the recent inflows has been, relative to the "permanent" flow component.
The paper then analyzes the implications for policy in the recipient countries.  The case of
capital controls is analyzed  first. Their feasibility  appears problematic.  If feasible, the case for direct
intervention would be generally based on second-best considerations, either on microeconomic or
macroeconomic  grounds,  whose trade-offs are difficult to  assess.  The exceptions are certain
microeconomic  distortions  that directly  induce excessive liabilities, in which case a Pigouvian tax (or
equivalent capital control) would be first-best policy.
Finally, to  the extent that capital inflows are permitted to  materialize, a broad  range of
macroeconomic policy responses is analyzed and evaluated, namely foreign exchange flexibility,
sterilized  foreign  exchange  rate  intervention, monetary  policy  aimed at  reducing  the  money
3multiplier, and contractionary fiscal policy. Choices confront the policymakers at each step in this
progression. Relevant  considerations  include the economy's level of capacity utilization, the identity
of the nominal anchor, the sterilization tools available to the Central Bank, the degree of capital
mobility, the financial health of domestic banks, the sophistication of the financial system, and the
flexibility  of fiscal policy, among others.
The desirable  policy response depends both on the characteristics of the flows themselves as
well as those of the recipient economy.  In view of the multiplicity of factors that should in principle
influence  the response of macroeconomic  policies,  as well as the sustainability considerations specific
to  each country, no single combination of policies is likely to be optimal in all cases.  Substantial
uncertainty  and risks concerning the sustainability  of the inflows compound the policy problem and
put a premium on prudence.
4I.  Introduction
Flows  of  foreign financial capital  to  developing countries have exhibited  an episodic
pattern  over  the past  two decades.  The period  1973-81 witnessed massive capital  flows to
countries  in many parts of the developing world, largely in the form of private syndicated bank
loans  directed to  the public  sector.  Such lending effectively dried up for many  (but not all)
developing countries during the debt crisis period 1982-89.  In recent years, however,  a number
of  developing  countries  in  various  regions  of the  world have  once again  begun  to  receive
substantial inflows of foreign capital.  These flows have been notable not only for their magnitude,
but  also  for the break that they represent from  the period of the debt crisis  for many of the
countries  now receiving the inflows.  Though reduced access to foreign saving was previously
perceived as a serious constraint on growth prospects for many such countries, the recent surge
in capital inflows has not been taken as an unmitigated blessing.  Indeed, the surge of inflows has
triggered a new literature investigating  the appropriate policy response on the part of the recipient
countries.  The urgency of this issue has increased following the Mexican financial crisis at the
end of 1994.
This  paper assesses the state of this literature.  It is intended both to provide a summary
of  what  is currently  known about the various dimensions of the new capital  inflow episode,
focusing  specifically on  its causes and  sustainability, as  well as to evaluate  suggested policy
responses.2 The paper is divided  into seven sections. The next section provides background,
describing  the  international  environment  in  which  the  recent  capital  inflow  episode  has
materialized,  as well as the broad characteristics of the flows themselves.  Section III explores
why  the  receipt of capital  inflows by  a developing country may pose problems  for domestic
policy.  Because the answer to this question depends in part on the factors that drive the inflows
and their likely sustainability, these two issues are taken up successively in the two sections that
follow.  Section VI describes and evaluates possible policy responses on the part of the recipient
countries.  The  final section  summarizes  what  we  think we  know about the  new inflows,
focusing specifically on the policy message.
II.  Empirical background
In this section we examine the characteristics of the recent capital-inflow episode,  based
on the experience of a  broad sample of countries.  After describing in broad-brush fashion the
changed (relative to previous episodes) international and domestic environments in which the new
flows of capital to developing countries have materialized,  we discuss their magnitude, timing,
regional and country destination, asset composition, and sectoral destination.  Finally, we examine
macroeconomic outcomes during inflow episodes for a sample of recipient countries.
2 The paper does not treat policy issues that may arise either in the creditor countries or
for the international financial community in association with the new patterns of capital
movements.  For the latter, see Bacha (1993).
5A.  The domestic and external context
Since voluntary capital flows reflect endogenous responses of investors to the perception
of profitable  investment opportunities,  they must arise in response to changes in the economic
environment  in the recipient country, the source country, or perhaps both.  The recent capital-
inflow  episode  has  emerged  in  a  very  different  international environment  than  that  which
characterized  both the previous episode that started in the 1970s and the period  1982-89, with
substantial  changes in the economies both of the industrial source countries and the developing
recipient  countries.  The scope  of  such  changes covers  the  macroeconomic  and  regulatory
environments  in both sets of countries.
The period 1989-93 was a slow-growth period in the industrial world as a whole.3 The rate
of  growth  of real GDP,  which reached 4.4  percent for the G-7 countries as a group in  1988,
averaged 2.8 percent in 1989-90 and 1.1 percent in 1991-93.  Monetary policy has been used in
countercyclical fashion in the United States during this period, and both nominal and real interest
rates fell to extremely low levels in that country after 1988.  This was also true of rates of return
on other  assets,  such as real estate.  Short-term nominal interest rates peaked at 9.1 percent in
1989, and had fallen to 3.2 percent by 1993.  Long-term rates also fell dramatically,  by roughly
half.  Regarding  the  international trading  environment,  during  the  six-year  period  1988-93
developing  countries as a group,  as well as those in the regions of  Asia and  Latin  America
specifically, experienced adverse movements in their terms of trade.  For developing countries as
a group, the cumulative deterioration amounted to 5 1/2 percent over the period.  In spite of slow
industrial-country  growth and poor terms of trade, however, exports from both Asia and Latin
America grew  rapidly at the outset of  the current capital inflow episode.4
Concerning  the regulatory environment,  continued financial liberalization  in industrial
countries has produced changes that have made these countries'  capital markets more hospitable
to  developing-country  borrowers. 5 For  example,  several  industrial  countries  have  relaxed
regulations on foreign public issues in their capital markets.  SEC Rule 144A and Regulation S
in the United States eliminated settlement delays, and also facilitated registration and the payment
of dividends  (see El Erian (1992)).  Market credit rating standards for public bond issues have
been eased in Japan, and minimum rating requirements have been eliminated in Switzerland (see
Jaspersen  and  Ginarte (1993)). All of these changes have eased access of developing-country
borrowers  to capital markets in the industrial countries.  In addition to these,  the anticipated
3 The data in this paragraph are taken from IMF (1994).
4  This was also the case during the episode that preceded the debt crisis.
5 For an overview, see Goldstein and Mussa (1993).
6ratification of the North American Free trade Agreement (NAFTA),  with the announced intention
to incorporate in the near future other Latin American countries besides Mexico (Chile is the next
prospective candidate) is likely to have operated in the same direction.
On  the  part  of  the  developing  countries  themselves,  the  last  five years  have  seen
substantial changes in policy regimes, as many countries have moved in the direction of improved
macroeconomic management and widespread liberalization.  During the pre-1982 capital inflow
episode in Latin America,  increases in fiscal deficits and inflation were widespread (see Montiel
(1993)).  During  the current  episode,  however,  inflation and  fiscal deficits  have both  been
reduced, and the rate of economic growth has increased. 6 Export composition has become more
diversified in many countries.  For example, in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, the primary export
accounted for about half of total exports in the early eighties, but for only about a third by the end
of the decade. 7 Among the structural changes adopted by developing countries during the latter
part of the eighties were the removal of restrictions on foreign ownership which had  impeded
inflows of foreign direct investment.  Mexico removed many such impediments in 1991, while
Chile had done  so several years earlier.  In addition,  broader capital account liberalization has
been undertaken in a number of countries.8
B.  Characteristics  of the new inflows
1.  Magnitude
Measuring  the size of capital inflows raises a number of conceptual problems.  These
concern  whether the relevant measure should capture both private  and official flows, whether
flows  should be  measured  on gross or  net terms,  whether  in addition  to  the changes  in the
liabilities of domestic residents changes in their foreign assets should be included as well, and if
so,  whether foreign exchange reserves should be considered  as part of those assets.  Various
observers  have resolved these issues in different ways, and thus the figures cited in different
studies are not always comparable.  In this study, we adopt two different measures depending on
the purpose: i) characterizing the new inflows, addressed in this subsection and shown in Tables
1-3, or ii) describing the macroeconomic outcomes in recipient countries,  covered in the next
subsection and shown in Tables 4-5.
For the purpose of describing recent inflows, we report in Tables 1-3 net changes in the
liabilities of domestic agents to foreign private creditors.  While gross capital flows may be of
For a review of recent reforn  experience in Latin America,  see Edwards (1995).
7 See Kuczynski (1992).
8  The recent experiences of Mexico and Peru,  for example, are described in Mathieson
and Rojas-Suarez (1992).
7interest for certain purposes -- such as judging the extent of financial integration -- for most  of
the purposes that will interest us here it is the net flow that matters.9 Data limitations force us
to  restrict  our attention to changes in the liabilities of domestic agents only, so changes in the
stocks of assets held abroad by domestic residents are not included in the capital flow numbers
described in Tables 1-3.  '  This necessity has potential virtues, however: country risk, for example,
may be determined by the net obligations imposed on domestic agents by foreign liabilities.  If
so, the stock of private-source external liabilities may indeed be the relevant construct to measure
the pressure  imposed by capital  inflows on country creditworthiness.  We report changes in
liabilities to private creditors only, because these types of flows have dominated the recent inflow
episode.  For the purpose of assessing the additional resources provided by capital inflows to
finance domestic absorption, however,  the relevant capital-inflow measure is the capital account
of the  balance of payments,  which includes both changes in liabilities to official creditors and
changes in assets held abroad by domestic residents.  This is the measure adopted in Tables 4 and
5.
How  large,  then,  have recent  inflows been?  Irrespective  of  the particular  definition
chosen, the answer appears to be that they have been quite large compared to the preceding years
in  the  1980s, but  somewhat  smaller  than in  the years  preceding  the  1982 debt crisis  when
measured as a proportion of exports or national product.  To see this, it is useful to consider the
four-year period 1990-1993 as a basis for the measurement of capital inflows in the current surge,
the four-year period 1978-1981 for the measurement of capital inflows in the surge preceding the
debt crisis, and the debt crisis period 1982-1989. Table  1 presents the annual averages of capital
inflows in all developing countries for the three periods based on net flows  from private sources,
both long- and short-term.
Even at this level of aggregation, the last four years look very different from the period
of the debt crisis.  In the developing world as a whole, average capital inflows increased from
their debt-crisis levels by 1 1/2 percentage points of GNP to reach almost 3 percent of GNP.  For
this group of countries,  most of the "surge" took place in 1992-93, when total inflows averaged
3.8 percent of GNP, a notable increase over 1.7 percent in 1990-91.  Indeed, though inflows over
9 The existing literature  has not always drawn a clear distinction between an increase in
financial integration and the receipt of capital inflows.
10 Our data are from the World Debt Tahles, which do not include capital outflows.
The alternative of using the capital account of the balance of payments (from IES) would not
permit us to separate out private from official flows, nor to classify flows by asset type or
sectoral destination, as done in Tables 2 and 3.
8the entire period  1990-93 were somewhat smaller in relation to GNP than those observed prior
to the debt crisis,  over the last two years the magnitudes have been quite similar."
Table 1 Annual  Private  Capital  Net Flows  (All Developing  Countries)
1978-1981  1982-1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1990-1993
Long  Term  US$  mill.  53512  34581  44548  57560  98971  157656  89684
% Exports  12.3  5.9  5.4  6.5  10.9  16.6  10.1
% GNP  2.7  1.2  1.1  1.4  2.4  3.7  2.2
Short  Term  US$  mill.  22586  5379  13097  23404  28873  33546  24730
% Exports  5.2  0.9  1.6  2.7  3.2  3.5  2.8
% GNP  1.1  0.2  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.6
Total  US$  mill.  76098  39961  57645  80964  127844  191202  114414
% Exports  17.5  6.8  7  9.2  14.1  20.2  12.8
% GNP  3.8  1.4  1.4  2  3.1  4.5  2.8
Note  1/  Includes all developing  countnes  in the Debtor Reporting System of the World Bank as reported in the World Debt Tables 1994-95.
Private  long-term  net flows comprise  long-term  debt net flows from private  creditors and equity net flows, both direct  and portfolio, as reported
in  the World Debt  Tables. Private  short-term  net  flows are  total short-term  debt net flows as reported in the World Debt Tables (which excludes
IMF). Therefore, imputed flows due to the accumulation of interest arrears and to debt  stock reduction operations are not included.  Note 2/
Percentages  of exports  and GNP are  based on accumulated flows over the entire period reported, so they may differ from the simple averages
of annual percentages.
Source:  Debtor  ReporUng  System  and World  Debt Tables  1994-95  (World  Bank).
2.  Timing
The timing of the recent episode  has not been uniform  across countries.  As shown above, for
developing  countries as a group a break with prior experience is suggested in 1991 but is not clearly
evident until 1992-93.  However, in some regions  a discernible change occurred before that time.
The new surge in capital inflows first became manifest in Asia, a region in which by and large
developing countries did not lose access to world capital markets during the period following the
outbreak of the international debt crisis. Inflows accelerated during 1988 in Thailand, during 1989
in Malaysia,  and during 1990  in Indonesia,  according  to Bercuson and Koenig (BK, 1993).  The surge
started later in Latin America.  The data compiled by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (CLR, 1992)
suggest that the break in the capital inflow experience of this region came in 1990, when total net
inflows  as defined above amounted to US$ 24 billion, compared to a peak of US$ 15 billion during
the post-debt crisis  period 1983-89. For other regions of the developing world matters are less clear,
as indicated in the next subsection.
"  It is worth noting that what is measured in each case is the magnitude of ex post
flows, which are endogenous with respect to a variety of policy interventions.  Thus, even if
the flows are driven by events that are external to the recipient countries, these numbers do not
have an interpretation as measures of the size of an external shock.
93.  Regional and country destination
The regional breakdown of capital inflows to developing countries reveals that the surge
phenomenon is widespread, but is especially pronounced in East Asia and Latin America.  To show
this, in Table 2 below we allocate  the long-term private net flows reported in Table I into the regions
traditionally analyzed by the World Bank.
Table  2  Annual  Long-Term  Private  Capital  Net flows (By Region)
1978-81  1982-89  1990  l 991  1  992  1993  1990-93
SSA  US$ mill.  4673  2490  920  1548  676  2144  1322
% Exports  9.8  6  1.7  3  1.3  4.4  2.6
% GNP  2.7  1.5  0.6  1  0.4  1.3  0.8
EAP  US$ nill.  7906  9633  20520  25556  42538  62782  37849
% Exports  9  6.5  8.2  8.9  12.9  17.2  12.3
% GNP  1.8  1.5  2.3  2.6  3.9  5.4  3.7
LAC  US$  mill.  28850  10311  10651  22755  27894  57708  29752
% Exports  27.4  8  6  12.7  14.6  28.7  15.9
% GNP  4.4  1.4  1  2.1  2.3  4  2.5
MENA  US$  oill.  4100  3484  167  -130  1609  1618  816
% Exports  7.3  6  0.2  -0.2  1.9  2.2  1
%  GNP  2.2  1.2  0.1  0  0.6  0.7  0.3
SA  US$  mill.  684  2786  2606  2978  1786  5643  3253
% Exports  3.4  9.8  6.5  7  4.1  11.1  7.4
% GNP  0.4  1  0.7  0.9  0.5  1.7  1
ECA  US$  nill.  7299  5784  9649  4599  24330  27759  16584
%Exports  6.1  3.2  4.3  1.9  11.6  13.3  7.5
% GNP  2.3  0.8  0.7  0.4  2.3  3  1.4
Note 1/ Net flows are as reported in Table 1 and regions are defined  as in the World Debt Tables 1994-95.
Note 2/  Percentages of exports  and GNP are based on accumulated flows over the entire period reported, so they  may differ from the simple averages
of annual percentages.
Source: Debtor Reporting System and World Debt Tables 1994-95 (World Bank).
Leaving aside the transition economies, and comparing the debt crisis period with the most recent
period,  it  is evident that  the  "surge" has primarily been an East  Asian  and Latin  American
phenomenon.  A break from prior experience is already suggested for East Asia by 1990, and for
Latin  America  by  1991.  In both cases, the pace of inflows accelerated after  1991.  There is a
suggestion in Table 2 that the phenomenon may recently have become more widespread, reaching
South Asia as  well as Sub-Saharan Africa in 1993.12
12  Impressionistic evidence suggests that the phenomenon has recently become
important in India and Pakistan, as well as in Kenya and Uganda.
10Within each region, new capital flows have been  concentrated in several large developing
countries. Over the period from 1989 to mid-1993, for example, 85 percent of all portfolio flows to
East Asia were accounted for by China, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand,  while in Latin America
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela accounted for almost 95 percent of portfolio flows over
the same period (Gooptu (1994).
4.  Asset composition
Table 3 presents our estimates of the broad asset composition of the portfolio of claims
acquired  by private external investors on developing countries during the current capital inflow
episode, decomposing the flows reported in Table I into foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio
(bond and equity)  flows, and other.  The latter consists primarily of  bank lending.
Table 3  Asset Composition and Sectoral Destination of Long-Term Private Capital Net Flows (percentages)
1978-1981  1982-1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 1990-1993
FDI  18  38.7  55.9  61.1  46  41.3  47.6
Portfolioequitvflows  0.1  2.3  8.5  13.1  14.2  29.7  20.1
Portfolio  debt flows  3.3  7.6  7.2  17.9  10.7  25.2  17.8
Otherdebtflows  78.7  51.4  28.5  7.8  29.1  3.8  14.5
equity  18.1  41  64.3  74.3  60.2  71  67.7
debt  81.9  59  35.7  25.7  39.8  29  32.3
to the private sector  38.3  40.7  85.4  89.4  81.5  82  83.4
to  the  public  61.7  59.3  14.6  10.6  18.5  18  16.6
sector
Note 1/ New flows are as reported in Table 1.
Note 2/  Breakdowns follow World Debt Tables 1994-95 classifications:
i) Portfolio debt flows comprise bond debt and other debt flows are obtained as a residual;
ii)  Equity flows comprise direct and portfolio equity flows,  and debt flows  comprise portfolio debt flows and
other debt flows;
iii) Private sector destination compnises all equity flows and private non-guaranteed  debt flows. and public
sector destination comprises public and publicly guaranteed debt flows.
Source: Debtor Reporting  System  and World  Debt Tables  1994-95  (Korld Bank).
The recent experience is in stark contrast to what came before: i) there is a shift away from debt
instruments  in favor of equity instruments,  both direct and portfolio; ii) within debt flows, syndicated
bank loans are relatively  unimportant;  and iii) in contrast to the entire period 1978-89, portfolio flows
have increased immensely  in importance.  The greatly reduced role of commercial banks during the
current episode is immediately evident in the shrinkage of the category "other" during 1990-93 in
Table  3. It is clear from this table that capital flows to developing countries have not expanded
because  banks have gotten back into the business of lending to such countries, but rather because a
new category of lenders has become involved.
11The regional breakdown of asset composition reveals that  the above trends away from
commercial  bank lending  and in favor of portfolio and equity investment are widespread.  However,
significant disparities remain.  For example, in Latin America other debt flows are negligible and
portfolio investment  accounts for the majority  of inflows, while in East Asia the composition is more
balanced,  with FDI being the most important  item. It thus appears that, though changes in FDI flows
have  been significant  in the aggregate, their regional distribution has not been uniform.  Overall, 44
percent of the increase in inflows was in the form of FDI in Asia, though FDI accounted for only 17
percent ofthe  new inflows in Latin America (CLR (1993)).  Lack of uniformity in the composition
of inflows  has also characterized  country  experience even within the same region.  According to BK,
for example,  long-term  flows accounted for 45 percent of the improvement in the capital account in
Thailand, but for 70 percent in Malaysia and for all of the improvement in Indonesia.
An important characteristic of the assets acquired by investors in association with the new
inflows is that to  a large extent they are denominated in domestic currency, in contrast with the
syndicated bank loans associated with the previous episode.  This means that, unlike in the earlier
episode, external creditors are now exposed to exchange-rate risk -- specifically,  the risk of sudden
devaluation.  1
5.  Sectoral destination
There is a common perception that recent capital inflows have primarily  been directed to the
private sector in the recipient countries, but hard data on the sectoral distribution of capital inflows
broadly defined is scarce.  Table 3 presents our estimates of the share of long-term private-source
capital inflows reported in Table I that was invested in the private sector of the recipient economy
(excluding  investment  guaranteed  by the public sector). The last two rows of this table suggest quite
a drastic change in the sectoral composition of capital inflows during the recent episode, both in
relation to the debt crisis period and to the previous inflow episode.  The sectoral identity of the
borrower presents by far the most stark contrast between the current inflow episode and previous
experience,  and has important implications for policy in the recipient countries, to be taken up in
Section III.
C.  Macroeconomic outcomes in recipient countries
From the balance of payments  identity,  changes in capital inflows (i.e. capital account
inclusive  of official  transfers and errors and omissions) can be decomposed into changes in the trade
balance, net factor payments, and international reserves.  National accounting identities, in turn,
equate the trade deficit to the excess of domestic absorption over domestic production.  For given
13 This has been emphasized by Dooley, Fernandez-Arias,  and Kletzer (1994).  The
recent Mexican crisis confirmed this concern.
12domestic output and factor payments, additional capital inflows can be used to accumulate foreign
exchange reserves, increase domestic  investment,  or increase domestic consumption.  How have they
in fact been used during the current episode?' 4
Table 4 provides  evidence  on this issue for 14 recipient  developing countries experiencing the
largest surges of private inflows relative to the size of their economies.  The first three columns of
this table express reserve accumulation, net factor payments. and the trade deficit (defined as minus
the resource  balance) as shares of the capital inflows (measured as the capital account defined as
above) for each of the 14 countries during their respective "surge" periods.  Columns 4 and 5 refer
to the domestic absorption use of the trade deficit financed with capital inflows by examining how
increases  in absorption between "pre-surge" and "surge" periods were allocated to  increases in
consumption (that is decreases  in domestic saving) and investment. Column 6 estimates the fraction
of  capital inflows used for investment purposes once reserves accumulation and consumption
leakages are deducted.
Two points are clear.  First, a large proportion of the capital inflows have been used for
reserve accumulation rather than domestic absorption.  In half of the countries in the sample, the
accumulation of reserves accounted for at least 40 percent of the inflows, and in the case of Brazil
and Colombia, reserve accumulation exceeded the value of capital inflows, as both the current and
capital  accounts were in surplus during the relevant period.  Excluding Brazil  and Colombia, no
major  differences  emerge between East Asia and Latin American countries with regard to  the
importance  of reserve accumulation as opposed to  current account  deficits.  Second, in some
countries the domestic saving ratio declined as absorption increased.  While similar with regard to
reserve accumulation, the East Asian and Latin American regions are very different in this respect.
More generally,  they differ  in regard to changes in the composition of absorption (columns 4 and 5).
While increases in absorption between the "pre-surge" and  "surge" periods were dominated by
increased  investment in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, increases in consumption were
dominant in Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia.  Like the East Asian countries, Chile, Bolivia, and
Venezuela  also experienced larger increases in investment than consumption, but in none of these
countries were the changes  in the composition  of absorption as heavily biased in favor of investment
as in East Asia.
Some features of the broader macroeconomic experience of recipient countries are reported
in Table  5.  As shown in the fifth column of this table, base money growth has not  tended to
accelerate widely in the recipient countries.  With few exceptions, however, (Venezuela, Portugal,
the Philippines,  and Malaysia) money  multipliers  have increased. Nevertheless, increases in inflation
have not been widespread (column 8).  By contrast with inflation trends, real exchange  rate
14 To address this question, Tables 4 and 5 define capital inflows on a balance-of-
payments basis -- i.e.,  as net changes in all (private and official) external liabilities as well as
assets of domestic agents, excluding the central bank.
13Table 4 Use of Capital Inflows During Surge Periods a/
Allocation of Capital Account (%)  Use of Domestic
Absorption  Marginal
Reserve  Net Factor  Net Resource  (Percent)  Investment
Accumulation  Payments  B a I a n c  e  Consumption  Investment  Impact of
Deficit  Capital Inflows
Argentina  40  37  23  73  27  16
Chile  57  71  -28  21  79  34
Mexico  21  24  55  69  31  24
Venezuela  5  136  -41  40  60  57
Turkey  14  -44  130  117  -17  -14
Thailand  41  10  48  -196  296  174
Portugal  66  -118  152  196  -96  -33
Philippines  26  4  69  49  51  38
Malaysia  70  37  -7  13  87  26
Korea  31  35  34  -6  106  73
Indonesia  35  91  -27  -59  159  103
Colombia  425  241  -567  68  32  -103
Bolivia  10  31  59  20  80  72
Brazil  143  149  -193  b/  b/  b/
a/ Surge  periods  are  country-specific  based  on observed  capital  inflows  profiles.  They  are  as follows:  Argentina  (1991-93),
Chile  (1989-93),  Mexico  (1990-93),  Venezuela  (1991-93),  Turkey  (1990-92),  Thailand  (1  988-92),  Portugal  (1989-92),  Philippines  (1989-93)
Malaysia  (1990-93),  Korea  (1991-93),  Indonesia  (1990-92),  Colombia  (1  992-93),  Bolivia  (1990-93),  and  Brazil  (1991-93).  Due  to  data
limitations,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  and  Colombia  figures  may  exclude  1993  and  Korea  figures  may  include  only  1991. For  the calculation  of
columns  (4)  and (5),  pre-surge  periods  are  also  country-specific  and  were  defined  as the  period  immediately  before  the  surge
period  such that  both  pre-surge  and  surge  periods  are of equal  length.
b/ Results  are not  reliable  because  the  variation  in total  absorption  is negligible.
Col  (1),  (2)  and  (3);  Reserve  accumulation,  Net  Factor  Payments  and  minus  Net  Resource  Balance  as percentages  of Capital  Account  (inclusive  of Grants
and  Errors  and  Omissions)  dLring  surge  period  (IMF).  Col  (4) and  (5): Ratio  of  the  change  in  the  average  value  of consumption  and  investment  from pre-
surge  to  surge  periods  to  the  total  change  in  domestic  absorption  over  the  same  time  period  (based  on  consumption,  investment  and  domestic  absorption
ratios  to GDP).  (WVorid  Bank)  Col  (6)  Calculated  as  (100  - Col(1))  times  the  investment  fraction  given  in Col  (5). (It assumes  that  on the  margin  net  factor
payments  are  constant,  but  the increase  in domestic  absorption  is offset  by  reserve  accumulation  as measured  by  col  (1).)
Source: The World Bank and IMF.
appreciation  has been common, particularly in Latin America.  The significant devaluation that
Mexico  was forced to  make in December  1994 suggests that these changes cannot  simply be
integrated  as equilibrium phenomena.  Indeed, there  is a sharp regional contrast  regarding the
evolution  of the  real exchange  rate, with four  out  of five East Asian countries  avoiding real
appreciation, while only two out of seven Latin American countries in our sample have done so.
Larger real exchange rate appreciation translates into more imports and less exports.  For example,
during 1991-92, export revenue growth slowed sharply in Latin America. By contrast, recession in
industrial  countries and poor terms of trade performance have not prevented the rapid growth of
export revenues for Asian developing countries throughout the 1989-93 period.
14Table 5  Macroeconomic  Outcomes (Surge periods relative  to pre-surge periods) a/
Cumulative
Real Exchange  Real  Real  Real  Monetary  Money  Money  Domestic
Rate  Export  Import  GDP  Base  Multiplier  Multiplier  Inflation
Appreciation  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  (MI)  (M2)
b/  c/  c/  c/  c/  d/  d/  d/
Argentina  107.2  -12.7  55.1  11.8  -3949.9  47.4  61.7  -2631.0
Chile  7.3  2.0  -2.1  0.4  19.8  39.6  35.7  1.3
Mexico  39.5  0.2  -8.4  1.4  -5.0  96.2  39.9  -7.2
Venezuela  15.5  -6.3  42.7  8.9  -53.3  -29.9  -13.6  -28.0
Turkey  18.5  -3.4  10.6  2.9  -20.0  12.2  26.2  -3.1
Thailand  -1.9  -1.2  4.7  3.0  0.0  -0.1  16.0  2.7
Portugal  21.1  -1.9  -9.2  -1.5  15.9  -38.7  -38.3  2.0
Philippines  13.1  -4.5  -13.6  -3.4  6.5  -10.1  0.3  6.0
Malaysia  -6.3  -2.7  -10.6  -0.3  -0.3  -4.4  -6.0  1.1
Korea  -5.8  11.3  -4.9  -0.9  -0.8  16.1  6.9  -0.3
Indonesia  -2.0  8.0  17.6  0.1  2.2  6.9  41.0  1.1
Colombia  28.0  -2.3  37.9  0.7  5.6  8.4  8.4  -4.6
Bolivia  -13.8  -16.0  1.4  0.3  -21.8  20.2  51.2  -0.8
Brazil  -4.5  -11.6  -23.2  0.4  -628.6  ..  ..  -913.8
a/  Surge and pre-surge periods are as defined in Table 4.
bl First quarter 1994  with respect to the average  prevailing two years  before the surge.
c/ Difference  of the simple average  of annual rates between  the surge and pre-surge periods.
d/ Percentage  change between pre-surge and surge periods.
Source: The World Bank and IMF.
II.  The Policy Problem
As indicated in the introduction, the recent surge in capital inflows has been perceived as
presenting  a policy problem for the recipient countries, despite the urgency  with which renewed
access to world capital  markets by indebted countries was previously sought.  This section addresses
the question of why this is so. We proceed in two steps.  First we describe the textbook conditions
under which external borrowing can be welfare-enhancing, and then we examine ways in which
deviations  of actual circumstances from those assumed in the textbook case can cause a surge in
capital inflows to do economic harm.
A. The case for capital inflows
At first  glance, it is not obvious why an inflow of foreign saving to developing countries
should provide cause for policy concern.  Capital inflows are obviously not harmful per se.  For a
small economy facing perfect international capital markets, the optimal textbook policy -- i.e., that
15which would be chosen by a planner maximizing the discounted utility of a representative agent --
simply  amounts  to increasing  investment  until its marginal return equals the given cost of capital, and
choosing a path for consumption  that both distributes consumption optimally over time and satisfies
the economy's  intertemporal  budget constraint. Such an economy may thus import capital to smooth
consumption or to finance profitable investment opportunities that exceed the level of domestic
saving." 5 The paths of consumption, investment, and external borrowing that would be chosen by
the planner would also be generated by decentralized,  competitive private economies as long as there
are no distortions associated with the private allocation of foreign saving.
This  well-known analysis is of more than theoretical relevance.  While the slowdown in
developing-country  growth during the debt crisis has often been attributed to the adverse effects of
the debt "overhang"  on domestic investment,  some observers have concluded instead that the culprit
was the liquidity crunch imposed by credit rationing -- i.e., the cessation of net capital inflows (see
Borensztein (1990), and Cohen (1993)). If so, the removal of the debt overhang would be important
not because of the direct effects that doing so would have on the incentives facing economic agents
in the indebted countries, as is conventionally  presumed, but precisely because resolution of the debt
overhang would permit the resumption of capital inflows.
If this analysis  is correct, then the recent resumption of capital inflows is precisely what was
required in order to reactivate growth in the heavily indebted countries.  To identify the source of
harmiful  consequences  from capital inflows,  and thus to address the policy issues raised by the current
capital-inflow  episode, it is necessary to understand how the case for free capital mobility based on
the textbook analysis of optimal borrowing can break down.
B.  Micro distortions and macro stability
One potential  mechanism that would have this effect, while of possible relevance to  the
previous inflow  episode, is clearly not operative this time around. Specifically, if external borrowing
is centralized  in the hands of a "planner" who is either unwilling or unable to act in such a way as to
maximize  the welfare of the representative domestic agent, then the economic outcomes associated
with external borrowing  need not be  desirable.  In the previous inflow episode, when external
borrowing  was primarily undertaken by the public sector, the benevolence and competence of the
"planner" may have been a relevant issue. As indicated in Section II, however, these issues are of
much less importance  during the current episode, when external borrowing has been overwhelmingly
undertaken in decentralized fashion by private agents.
What  is  at issue in the context  of the current episode is indeed whether decentralized
borrowing  by private agents will reproduce the desirable outcomes that would be generated by a
benevolent and omniscient planner. There are two broad classes of reasons why this may fail to be
'"  This analysis concerns net capital flows.  Gross flows also serve an important
economic purpose,  providing portfolio managers the opportunity to diversify, thus improving
on the risk-return tradeoff they would face under financial autarky.
16the case -- the potential incidence of domestic microeconomic distortions and the effects of inflows
on macroeconomic  stability. Neither  of these issues, both of  which can motivate a concern with the
possible harmful effects of capital inflows, are addressed in the textbook argument for the welfare-
enhancing  role of capital  inflows  presented  above. In the case of  micro distortions, the analysis in the
textbook case, based on the behavior  of atomistic agents operating in perfectly competitive markets,
neglects the possible role of  a wide variety of distortions that could affect the efficiency with which
external resources are allocated in the capital-importing countries.  Allowing for such distortions
qualifies  the case for laissez faire, as we argue in Section VI.  Macro instability, on the other hand,
is a phenomenon  not well captured in the representative  agent models  that underpin the textbook case
for optimal external borrowing.
At the  microeconomic level, the presence of distortions creates the possibility that  the
resources  absorbed in association with  capital inflows will be misused, even if such resources are
primarily absorbed by the private sector.  Resource misallocation can arise due to the presence of
distortions  in the domestic financial sector and/or the real economy.  Moreover, microeconomic
distortions  can arise as a result of an inadequate macroeconomic policy framework.  In any case,
domestic  distortions can potentially interact with capital inflows in two distinct ways: on the one
hand, the welfare consequences  of existing  distortions can be aggravated by capital inflows that arise
from unrelated causes;  on the other hand, excessive  capital inflows  can be directly induced by changes
in distortions. The distinction is relevant for policy, as we argue below.  Potential micro distortions
include the following:
a.  Distortions  to  the perceived private cost  of foreign capital could arise due to  externalities
associated  with  aggregate country risk and credit rationing resulting from limited cross-border
contract enforceability.
b.  As mentioned by CLR (1992), distortions in the financial sector could give rise to  improper
financial  intermediation. Such distortions could take the form of incomplete financial markets, pre-
existing  improperly-priced (possibly implicit) government deposit insurance, or speculative bubbles
in particular domestic asset markets (e.g.,  equity and real estate) induced by the inflows themselves.
c.  Real-sector distortions,  such as imperfect competition, extemalities, or  wage rigidity,  may result
in inappropriate  private sector adjustment (e.g. suboptimal adjustment of  the tradable sector to
fluctuating exchange rates), even in the context of a well-functioning financial system.
d.  Microeconomic distortions may be created by macroeconomic policies not  expected  to  be
sustained, such as "incredible" trade liberalization or price stabilization." 6
The first three effects above could  be valid for any level of availability  of external capital, but
the cost of the distortion would presumably increase when external capital becomes more plentiful
16 See Calvo (1989), as well as Calvo and Vegh (1991).
17(i.e.  the  supply schedule shifts upwards).  Consequently, in each of  these cases the  costs  of
independently-existing  domestic  microeconomic distortions are  aggravated by  changes  in the
macroeconomic  environment -- in the instances cited above, when foreign capital becomes more
plentiful  for  any reason.  The distortions are aggravated because of increased borrowing  (a),
increased intermediation through the domestic financial system (b) or increased domestic aggregate
demand (c).  The final  argument differs, in that it attributes the capital inflow itself to the creation of
a new domestic distortion.  The implications of these distortions are that the resources associated
with capital inflows may be devoted to consumption of low social value or invested in socially low-
yielding projects, at the expense of high-value fiture  consumption that will have to be sacrificed to
service the accumulated liabilities.
The problems that  have occupied  most  observers,  however, have concerned  short-run
macroeconomics.  Obviously,  for countries that are net external  borrowers a reduction in foreign real
interest rates is a favorable shock.  This does not mean, of course, that macroeconomic policymakers
can ignore its implications. The analogy is to the case of "Dutch disease," where a favorable terms
of trade shock can complicate  macroeconomic management.  While the shock may be favorable, the
economy's macroeconomic adjustment mechanism may generate undesirable side effects.  The
mitigation of such effects provides the rationale for an adjustment in macroeconomic policies.
Specifically, surges in capital inflows have been associated with:'"
e.  A loss of domestic monetary control.  This is perceived to be of particular consequence in
countries undergoing money-based  stabilizations,  but concerns a broader range of countries  as well.
f.  Either independently or as a  result of  (e), upward pressure on asset  prices, an expansion of
demand for home goods, and consequent increase in economic activity, which is associated with  a
real exchange rate appreciation, as well as an acceleration in domestic inflation and a deterioration
of the current account of the balance of payments.  The real appreciation is feared  to  undermine
ongoing trade  reforms and long-run external competitiveness by eroding the profitability of the
traded-goods sector.
g.  A potential  increase in macroeconomic instability, to the extent that capital inflows are
themselves unstable.
Notice that all of these reflect an interpretation of capital inflows as an expansionary financial shock
acting upon the domestic macroeconomic environment, and (e) through  (g) merely list alternative
negative macroeconomic symptoms of such a shock.
To summarize, the argument for welfare-enhancing capital inflows can break down if there
are severe micro distortions  that lead decentralized economies far from the allocations that would be
generated by a benevolent planner, and/or if the receipt of foreign capital threatens macro stability.
Either set of circumstances may call for a policy response.  It is worth emphasizing, however, that
'7 See Schadler et. al. (1993).
18the possibility  that capital  inflows  may be welfare-reducing  does not create a presumption that recent
inflows have indeed been harmful.  On micro grounds, not only can capital inflows triggered by
extemal events  arrive in a domestic environment  which is free of distortions, as in the textbook case,
but such  flows can also be attracted by the act of  removing distortions.  Under these alternative
scenarios,  the  receipt  of  foreign  capital  may  be  welfare-enhancing  at  a  micro  level.  On
macroeconomic grounds, the stimulus to aggregate demand provided by the arrival of inflows may
be welcome in economies  with excess productive capacity. Moreover, if the inflow of capital proves
to be sustained,  it need not be associated  with increased  macroeconomic  instability. The upshot is that
the nature of the policy problem posed by the receipt of capital inflows depends on a complex array
of factors, such as the causes of the inflow (e.g., the role of changes in distortions), the allocative
efficiency  of the domestic economy,  the domestic macroeconomic  context, and factors that determine
the sustainability of inflows.
IV.  Causes of Capital Inflows
Of  these factors, the existing literature has devoted most attention to the identification of
causes.  As indicated above, whether a domestic policy response is desirable in the face of a surge
in capital inflows depends both  on the causes of such inflows and on the characteristics of the
recipient economy described previously.  The assessment of causes is important for two  other
reasons, however, that have to do with policy design. First, the forecast of the likely evolution of
the inflows, which is clearly relevant for policy design, requires the identification of  causal factors.
Second, the assignment of instruments, and thus the effectiveness of public policy, depends on the
nature of the underlying  causes.  Here a  domestic-foreign causal dichotomy is particularly relevant.
If causes are external,  they are by definition  exogenous and only indirect, compensatory policies can
be considered.  If causes are domestic, however, more direct measures may be feasible.
A. An Analytical Framework
A useful analytical framework separates potential domestic causes into those which operate
at the "project"  and country levels. Building on Fernandez-Arias (1994), suppose that capital flows
can potentially occur in the form of transactions in various types of assets, indexed by s, where s =
1,..n.  The domestic return on an asset of type s is decomposed into a "project" expected return D,
and a "country  creditworthiness"  adjustment  factor C, which is bounded between zero and one.  The
project  return  depends inversely on the vector F of net flows to projects of all types (based on a
diminishing  marginal  productivity  argument), while the creditworthiness factor is a negative function
of the vector of the end-of-period stocks of liabilities  of all types, denoted S  (= S, + F).  Voluntary
capital flows (components of the vector F) are determined by the arbitrage condition:
D,[d, F]Cj[c, S_l  + F] = W,[w, S-, +F]  (1)
where W, is the opportunity cost of funds of type s in the world economy, taken to depend on the
stock of liabilities  S to reflect  portfolio diversification  considerations for external creditors.  The shift
factors  d,  c,  and w  are associated  respectively with  the domestic  economic climate, country
19creditworthiness,  and any creditor  country financial conditions relevant for developing country
investment (e.g., financial returns and capital-market regulations).  The convention adopted is that
the functions  Ds,  Cs,  and W, are increasing in the shift parameters.  Equation (1) defines F implicitly.
Thus, in this framework  capital flows  will be determined  by d, c, w, and Sl  --  i.e., by domestic factors
operating  both at the project and country levels, as well as by factors pertaining to the external
environment.  The assumptions made above imply'" that  the components  of the vector  F are
increasing  in d  and c, but  decreasing in w and S-,.  Initial stocks S  are of course dynamically
endogenous.  Ultimately, the sequence of flows F depends on the path of the underlying factors d,
c, and w. Increases  in d and c or decreases in w could generate a sustained surge in inflows like the
one observed in practice.
Possible  causes of the recent inflow episode can be associated with each of these variables.'9
Potential domestic factors operating at the "project" level (underlying d) include:
a.  Improved  policies that increase the long-run expected rate of return, and/or reduce the
perceived risk, on real domestic investment, such as  major domestic structural and institutional
reforms (including  domestic financial  liberalization  and trade reform, as well as privatization of  public
enterprises). Improved domestic  macroeconomic  policies,  especially  successful inflation stabilizations
accompanied by fiscal adjustment widely perceived as sustainable, would also have this effect.
b.  Short-run macroeconomic policies that increase the expected rate of return  on domestic
financial instruments, resulting in ex ante positive interest rate differentials, for given values of the
"structural"  determinants  of the marginal  product of capital. These essentially refer to tight monetary
and/or loose fiscal policies.
c.  Policies  that increase  the openness of the domestic financial market to foreign investors,  such as
the removal of capital controls and liberalization of restrictions on foreign direct investment.
d.  Structural and/or macroeconomic policies that, because of their lack of credibility, distort
intertemporal  relative  prices -- i.e., "incredible"  trade liberalizations and price stabilization programs.
Tariffs cuts under domestic price rigidities, for example, may create expectations that the relative
price of imports will rise over time when tariff levels are restored (CLR (1993)).
Because  country creditworthiness C depends on the expected present value of resources
available for external payments relative to the country's liabilities,  we can interpret c as referring to
the former.  One way to conceptualize this present value measure is to express c in the form:
c  = Y/ (R - g),  (2)
*  Weak assumptions regarding stock effects across types of assets are also needed.
'9 See Schadler et. al. (1993), CLR (1993).
20where  Y is some current measure of available resources, assumed to grow at the rate g, and  the
discount rate R (relevant to claimholders) should be based on world financial returns available at
comparable maturities.  Note that the country creditworthiness parameter c depends not only on
domestic factors (such as Y and g) but also on foreign  returns R. 20 Domestic factors operating at the
"country" level (through c) include:
a.  Debt-equity swaps, and sustainable debt and debt service reduction agreements, as in Brady
operations.
b.  Stabilization  and structural policies that effect the aggregate efficiency of resource
allocation.
c.  Shocks to national income in the form of changes in  international terms of trade.
d.  Policies that affect the level of domestic absorption relative to income.
But, importantly, the country creditworthiness parameter c also depends on external factors:
e.  Foreign interest rates
Finally,  external factors affecting the external opportunity cost of funds W (through w) are:
a.  Foreign interest rates and/or recession abroad.
b.  Easing of regulations affecting the cost of access to capital markets in creditor countries.
c.  Bandwagon effects in international capital markets, either resulting from the efficient signalling
of information on fundamentals or from speculative bubbles.
The  implication of equation (1)  is that  any combination of these factors  could operate
simultaneously to influence the observed magnitude of capital inflows.  Disentangling the separate
contributions  of these multiple factors is therefore an empirical problem. As indicated in Section II,
the domestic and external environment during the recent inflow episode has featured significant
changes  in  several of these  factors,  occurring at  nearly the same time.  Thus,  the  empirical
identification of causes does not represent an easy task.
B. The Evidence
By and large, this task has not been attempted in a comprehensive fashion.  Most observers
have  tended  to  favor one  of two  views about the factors driving the current  inflow episode.
20 This non-conventional channel of foreign interest rate effects has been emphasized
and quantified by Fernandez-Arias (1994).
21Typically, the "pull" view perceives inflows as attracted to the recipient countries by an improved
domestic policy environment (some combination of  changes in parameters d and c in equation (1)),
while the "push"  view attributes  the phenomenon to lower returns available in the creditor countries
(changes in R). 2 " At a superficial  level, the "push"  view seems compelling  -- the timing of  US  interest
rate decreases clearly fits that of the advent of capital flows  to developing  countries as a group quite
closely.  Chart I below shows the close association between aggregate private capital inflows to all
developing countries and the evolution of US interest rates.
The close inverse correlation between US interest rates, both short and long term, and the capital
flows reported in Table I is evident in the chart. While the short-term interest rate in the US trended
downward during 1989-90, sharp decreases occurred  both at the beginning of 1991 and 1992, and
in both instances coincided with increases in capital flows during the subsequent year.
At  the  same time, however,  case studies for  individual countries that  have been large
recipients  of capital inflows can almost invariably identify significant changes in policy regimes
immediately  preceding the inflow episode (see Montiel (1995)).  Thus, plausible cases can be made
for either perspective.  The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, of course, and the issue is
assessing their relative empirical importance.  In the remainder of this section we describe and
evaluate the formal evidence on this issue.
1.  Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1992)
Much of the systematic  empirical work on the issue of causation has focused on  identifying
whether  the changes that triggered the recent capital flows originated in the creditor  or debtor
countries.  In an influential series of papers, for example, CLR have argued that, while domestic
factors were undoubtedly important in attracting inflows, such factors cannot explain why inflows
occurred in countries that had not undertaken reforms or why when reforms were started earlier, the
inflows  did not materialize till 1990. They have thus emphasized the role of external factors.  Their
formal evidence takes the following form:
a.  Principal component analysis establishes a significant degree of comovement among foreign
reserves  and real  exchange rates for ten Latin American countries during 1990-91, interpreted as
proxies for F.  The first principal  component explains  a larger share of the variation in the ten reserve
and real exchange rate series during 1990-91  than in 1988-89. For the rate of inflation, however, the
extent of comovement diminished in the more recent period.
21 The characteristics of inflows described in the previous section indeed makes some of
these mechanisms more plausible than others ex ante.  The widespread and persistent nature of
the inflow phenomenon would seem to favor global, persistent factors and rule out an
important role for idiosyncratic, volatile factors.  The latter include "incredible" trade
liberalizations and price stabilizations.  While intertemporal speculation may have played a
role in specific cases,  it is unlikely to account for the magnitude, distribution,  or persistence of
flows.
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b.  The first principal components of both the reserve and real exchange rate series display a large
bivariate correlation with several US financial variables used as indicators of foreign rates of
return.
c . Tests of  Granger causality for individual  countries tended to find causation running from
reserves to real exchange rates, rather than the reverse. This pattern also held for the first
principal components of the two sets of series.
d.  Structural VARs involving reserves, real exchange rates, and the first two principal
components of the US financial variables, suggested that the foreign factors exerted causal
influences over the domestic variables, and both variance decompositions and impulse response
functions indicated that the foreign factors played a large role in accounting for reserve and real
exchange rate movements.
2.  Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993)
Recently, Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (CCM, 1993) have attempted to disentangle
the roles of domestic and external factors in motivating capital inflows. Using monthly bond and
equity flows from the US to nine Latin American and nine Asian countries over the period
January 1988 to July 1992, they estimated separate panel regressions explaining  bond and equity
flows as functions of country-specific variables (country credit rating, price of debt on the
23secondary market, price-earnings ratio in the domestic stock maLrket,  and the black market
premium) as well as external variables (US interest rates and US industrial activity).  They found
that bond flows (but not equity flows) responded strongly to the country credit rating, while
price-earnings ratios were uniformly important. However. US interest rates also entered
significantly  with the theoretically expected negative sign in all the regressions.  To assess the
relative importance of domestic and foreign variables, they computed the sum of standardized
coefficients for the two sets of variables, finding that domestic and external variables have been
about equally important in Latin America, but domestic variables had sums of standardized
coefficients that were three to four times larger than those of external variables in Asia for both
bond and equity flows.
3.  Fernandez-Arias (1994)
A recent paper by Fernandez-Arias (1994) addressed some of the limitations of both the
original CLR study as well as that of CCM, and at the same time considered some of the less
formal arguments presented by other observers in support of an important role for domestic
factors.  Like CCM, Fernandez-Arias relied on data that measure capital movements directly,
rather than on proxies in the fornm  of reserve and real exchange rate changes, as in CLR.
However, he argued that the attribution of variation in country-specific financial variables to
domestic shocks in CCM is improper, and in particular that country creditworthiness, as indicated
by the price of debt on secondary markets, is itself heavily dependent on external factors.  As
noted above, if the parameter c in equation (1) is expressed as in equation  (2), it has a domestic
component given by the path of Y and an external component in the form of R.
Fernandez-Arias decomposed post-1989 increases in portfolio (bond and equity) inflows
for 13 developing countries into portions attributable to changes in the domestic investment
climate, country creditworthiness,  and  foreign interest rates. He did so by regressing deviations
in such flows from their 1989 values on corresponding deviations in the external interest rate and
in the price of debt on the secondary market (based on a simple burdensharing model that linked
cre'ditworthiness  to this variable), using fixed-effect panel estimates for which the intercept term
was interpreted as the change in the domestic investment climate.  For the "average" developing
country in the sample, changes in international interest rates proved to be the dominant force in
explaining surges in capital inflows, accounting for over 60 percent of the deviation in such flows
from the 1989 level.  An extra 25 percent was due to changes in creditworthiness, leaving only
about 12 percent to be explained by improvements in the domestic investment climate. Moreover,
when account is taken of the role of extemal interest rates in determining the secondary-market
debt price used as the creditworthiness indicator, thereby decomposing the latter into domestic
and foreign components, fully 86 percent of the surge in inflows is attributed to movements in
external interest rates.
4.  Dooley,  Fernandez-Arias, and Kletzer  (1994)
A somewhat different approach was followed by Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, and Kletzer
(1994) (hereafter DFK) based on the above-mentioned decomposition of creditworthiness into
24domestic and foreign components.  They argued that the price of commercial-bank debt is a
sensitive proxy for capital inflows, since shifts in the demand for claims on developing countries,
whether emanating from changes in domestic or external factors, should be reflected in these
prices. Thus, rather than explaining  capital inflows directly, they attempted to account for the
behavior of secondary-market prices on debt since 1989 which, consistent with their interpretation
of the relationship between such prices and capital flows, have risen markedly.  They found that
essentially all of the increase in price could be accounted for by declining international interest
rates, once the purely arithmetic price effect of the reduction in the face value of debt for a given
market value is removed, leaving almost nothing to be explained by improvements in the domestic
environment.
5.  Schadler et. al. (1993)
These findings concerning the crucial role of foreign factors have not gone unchallenged,
however.  In addition to the moderate support for the role of domestic factors provided in CCM,
a recent report by Schadler et. al. (1993) argued that, while foreign phenomena may have been
important, such influences cannot be regarded as dominant, for several reasons:
a.  First, they argued that the timing of the relevant changes in external factors did not coincide
with that of the inflows.
b.  Second, they noted that the timing, persistence, and intensity of inflows has varied
considerably across countries that have received inflows, suggesting that investors have
responded to changes in country-specific factors over time.
c.  Third, they also noted that surges in capital inflows have not been universal within regions of
developing countries, so that external creditors have clearly exercised some cross-country
discrimination in the allocation of funds.
C.  An assessment
In spite of these arguments, the weight of the formal evidence would appear to be on the
side of  the "push" view that  falling US interest rates have played a dominant role in driving
capital flows to developing countries.  The strongest arguments for "pull" factors rely on
geographic variation in the distribution of capital inflows.  Even this, however, can be problematic
--  while it is true that not all countries have been recipients of the new inflows, it is also true that
flows have not been restricted to countries with well-established track records of macroeconomic
and structural adjustment.  Both Peru and Brazil, for instance, received substantial inflows in
1992, while both countries still confronted severe macroeconomic imbalances.
More importantly, while timing information directly relates to the notion of causality,
cross-country information requires additional assumptions to separate causes from passive
country-specific factors that merely interact with the underlying causes.  In terms of equation (1),
a change in F from am initial equilibrium  must reflect a corresponding change in d, c, or w.
25Because external factors underlying w and c are the same across countries, the observation that
the change in F differed between countries A and B tells us only that d and/or c were different in
the two countries, not that domestic factors induced changes in d or c in either country.
Differences in capital inflow levels across countries confirm the importance of country-specific
characteristics, but they do not imply that country-specific changes caused the inflows, as implied
by the "pull" story.  Thus, cross-country differences in capital inflows may have more to do with
where "pushed" foreign capital is absorbed than with how foreign capital is "pulled."
It is important to note that even a situation where some countries receive no new capital
inflows at all is consistent with the "push" view.  The solution for F from equation (1) may entail
an extremely low level of capital inflows or capital outflows (negative values of various
components of F), implying transfers of resources that the country is unwilling to undertake.
Under such circumstances, the solution or F would be subject to an inequality constraint of the
form:
F  Ž  F^.  (3)
If this constraint is binding, voluntary capital flows of such types would cease, and equation (1)
would become an inequality, no longer determining any observed  (involuntary) capital flows.,
which would be determined by (3) as an equality.  As long as fluctuations in external conditions
leave (3) binding, capital inflows would be unchanged.
As this discussion suggests, in interpreting the evidence reviewed above it is important to
distinguish between two different issues: explaining the variation of changes in F across time and
countries, and explaining why many countries experienced large positive changes in F after 1989.
The first is the more relevant problem for policy issues, because it essentially involves specifying
the function that links F to d, c, w for each country.  The capital-inflow literature, however, has
largely focused on the second.  Here the issue is linking observed large positive changes in F to
changes in d, c, w that may have brought them about.  Regarding this, the safest conclusion to
draw is that  the existing evidence probably tells us more about factors that have been important
in explaining capital inflows than about factors that have not.  In terms of equation (1), in other
words, it is reasonable to conclude based on the evidence reviewed that for many countries
observed changes in F have been associated with changes in international interest rates R, but not
that they have not been associated with other factors inducing changes in the values of d, c, or w
either in those countries or others.
In the case of the domestic factors, the main reason that this is so is that "push" variables
are easier to measure than "pull" factors.  In theory, inflows are endogenous with respect to a
wide range of domestic policies, and no single indicator is likely to represent the broad thrust of
such policies with the same degree of accuracy as external interest rates do for foreign financial
conditions.  Indeed, "pull" factors have been proxied in very rough ways in the literature
26reviewed. Thus, measurement error is much more likely to afflict "pull" than "push" factors.2 2 A
second reason is that much of the existing literature has been restricted to explaining portfolio
flows.  As shown in Section II, foreign direct investment has been at least as important in many
cases, and the latter may be more sensitive to domestic factors than the more liquid portfolio
flows.
With regard to external factors, we would argue that  a complete story about the factors
driving the new inflows must account for changes in the composition of assets acquired by
external creditors as well as in the identity of domestic borrowers.  As indicated in Table 3, these
phenomena present a dramatic contrast between the current and previous inflow episodes.  The
"push" story based simply on low US interest rates fails to address this issue.  External-source
shocks have been proxied by foreign rates of return in the empirical literature.  As a result, the
role of structural changes in creditor-country financial markets that have eased access to such
markets by developing-country borrowers has not been considered in such tests. This makes the
existing literature unable to distinguish between changes in the degree of financial integration
(except for factors pertaining to country default risk) and  changes in relative ex ante  rates of
return.  The distinction is crucial for the central question that has motivated this literature -- that
of sustainability. To the extent that the new flows represent a one-time portfolio adjustment
driven by "permanent" changes in the degree of world financial integration, their high level is not
sustainable, contrary to the push story based on permanent reductions in R, but they are less likely
to be reversed than if they are driven by temporarily low US interest rates.
Thus, a consistent story about the factors driving and directing the recent surge in capital
inflows probably has to feature some combination of "push" and "pull" factors.  One such story
would proceed as follows: the combination of low interest rates and recession made for low rates
of return on industrial-country assets (particularly in the United States), creating an incipient
capital outflow as investors in these countries sought higher-yielding assets for their portfolios.
The restoration of perceived creditworthiness was necessary for potential debtor countries to have
access to these funds, and thus capital flowed initially  to those countries whose creditworthiness
was not severely impaired during the decade of the eighties --largely the rapidly-growing
countries in East Asia that never underwent a debt crisis.  The Brady plan, announced in mid-
1989, had the effect of broadening the geographic scope for such inflows to encompass the
heavily-indebted countries in Latin America, in part by writing down the face value of debt, in part
by supporting policy adjustments, and in part by providing information externalities, leading to
bandwagon effects.  Where none of these factors have come into play -- i.e., in Sub-Saharan
Africa -- capital  inflows  have not materialized.
Beyond this, while the weighing of push and pull factors is informative for policy for the
22  In Fernandez-Arias  (1994), for example, "pull" factors are proxied by a shifting
intercept term.  In Dooley, Fernandez-Arias,  and Kletzer (1994), their contribution is captured
in the unexplained portion of the secondary debt price, a procedure which is sensitive to the
validity of the underlying burdensharing model.
27reasons mentioned at the beginning of the section, this is at best a point of departure for policy
analysis, because the mapping from "pull" or "push" views to policy is highly imperfect. As
indicated above, policy design requires the specific identification both of causal factors and
country circumstances.  One important additional piece of information for policy design is the
assessment of the likely evolution of causes and circumstances over time (e.g. whether shocks are
permanent or transitory, volatile or highly predictable, etc.).  These issues are taken up in the next
section.  Even with a perfect forecast, policy prescriptions are far from clear.  While the implicit
assumption appears to be that capital inflows attracted by improved domestic policies do not
present a policy problem, while those driven by expansionary monetary policy abroad do, this
view is unwarranted.  Even a "pull" exerted by moving from a distorted to a completely
undistorted  domestic microeconomic environment could generate macro stability problems,
calling for a macro policy response. On the other hand, a "pull" generated by either a partial
removal of domestic distortions or  the introduction of new distortions could be welfare-reducing
on micro grounds as well.  Similarly,  the implications for policy of an inflow generated by a
foreign "push" are ambiguous in general, and crucially depend on the characteristics of the
domestic economy discussed in Section III.  The links between the factors driving inflows and the
indicated policy response are discussed more fully in Section VI.
V.  Sustainability
As indicated in Section III, the policy concern with the effects of inflows has partly been
based on the perception that they may threaten macroeconomic stability. This concern arises in
part out of a fear that the flows may be transitory.  While even "permanent" inflows can create
adjustment problems, inflows that are not sustained are perceived as potentially destabilizing the
domestic economy both when they arrive and when they depart.  The issue of sustainability  can
be decomposed into two parts: First, what is the expected time path of the conditions driving the
inflow episode (e.g. how long are the conditions likely to persist)?  Second, what are the
corresponding likely implications for capital inflows? Specifically,  is the alternative to the current
level of inflows a continuation of inflows at a reduced rate (soil landing), a cessation of inflows
(hard landing), or pressures for the actual reversal of capital flows and a balance of payments
crisis (crash)? Unfortunately, in spite of the policy concerns that motivate such questions, the
literature to date has shed little light on them, apart from the identification of causes.  In this
section, we attempt to address the issue in a preliminary  way.
The first of the two questions is not well posed as presented, since from the perspective of
recipient-country policymakers it makes an important difference whether the factors driving the
inflow are exogenous or endogenous to their actions.  If they are exogenous then it is indeed
meaningful  to ask how permanent  the shock is likely to be, and the optimal policy response may
(but need not) be a function of the answer to this question. 23 If they are endogenous, however,
23 The reason that optimal policy response need not depend on the expected duration of
inflows is that the private sector may be as well informed about this factor as the public sector,
in which case an argument for policy intervention would have to be based on the
28the duration of the shock is itself an outcome of actions taken by policymakers,  and not an aspect
of the environment to which they have to respond.  As suggested in the discussion of equation
(3), the achievement of a sufficiently  low level of country risk may be a necessary condition for
capital inflows to materialize, and cross-country  differences in this factcr may help explain
geographic variation in the receipt of capital inflows.  Superimposed on this, however, has been a
substantial external shock in the form of lower interest rates in the United States and, as indicated
in the previous section, the existing evidence suggests that this may have been a key driving
factor determining the magnitude of flows of capital to creditworthy developing countries (as well
as improvements in country creditworthiness).  Empirically,  therefore, the current inflow episode
is likely to represent a mix of endogenous and exogenous events.  In this context, it is meaningful
to ask both how long the latter can be expected to be sustained as well as what the likely
consequences would be of a reversal either of domestic policies or external circumstances.
A.  Duration of the external shock
One way to gauge the likely duration of the foreign interest rate shock is by examining the
implicit predictions of future short-term interest rates captured in the term structure.  As of the
third quarter of 1994, the term structure of interest rates for the United States suggested that over
the next five years interest rates are expected to rise, continuing their upward trend during 1994
(see Chart 2). Thus, markets apparently do not expect the favorable external interest rate shock to
persist.
If realized, this increasing trend will, ceteris paribus, gradually reduce the incentives for
reallocating portfolios to developing countries.  Equations (1) and (2) suggest that such incentives
would be reduced both by increasing the opportunity cost of funds  and by  increasing country
risk. Thus, both mechanisms have a bearing on sustainability. They will be analyzed successively
in the rest of the section.
We first analyze the country risk mechanism, which holds the key to extreme forms of
unsustainability, such as the debt crisis.  As indicated in equation (2), this mechanism operates
through the market valuation of the value of the present and future resources  available to the
country as a whole to service its external liabilities. As explained in the previous section, beyond a
threshold point country risk may be too high to sustain voluntary inflows: equation (1) would
yield inflow levels lower than what could be generated according  to the country's capacity to pay.
In this case crisis and capital rationing would ensue.  In what follows we construct a simple
creditworthiness index to measure the pressure on repayment capacity that is exerted by the
service of foreign liabilities,  which can be used to shed light on the likelihood of a crisis.
presence of distortions that cause the optimality of private sector responses to depend on the
duration of the shock.  In the absence of distortions, unsustainability does not warrant policy
intervention.
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B.  An index of creditworthiness
Since in the current inflow episode foreign liabilities  have primarily  been incurred by the
private sector (see Table 3) and to a large extent denominated in domestic currency, country risk
is likely to be associated with balance of payments crises and the attendant likelihood of
devaluation and the imposition of capital controls, rather than with fiscal problems. 24 Without
speculating about how such a crisis would play itself out internally (and specifically  whether or
not private liabilities  would be nationalized) 25, the country's repayment capacity can be taken to
depend on its ability to generate a trade surplus -- i.e., to expand exports and contract imports (as
well as to deplete accumulated international reserves), which depends on its potential production
of traded goods.  From the perspective of external creditors, the operational  significance of the
quality of the domestic policy environment is reflected in this variable.  Since the present and
future values of maximum trade surpluses are unobservable, for the purpose of constructing a
sustainability index, capacity to pay can be proxied by a fraction f of total production of traded
goods, fT.
The present value of this capacity to pay can be compared with an accumulated stock of
foreign liabilities S to assess whether the accumulation of additional liabilities  can be supported by
the country's resources.  Such a comparison forms the basis for our operational measure of
creditworthiness.  The present value of resources  is given by an expression similar to equation (2)
with Y=fr,  vwhere  g is the long-run growth rate of traded goods production. Let S be the
accumulated stock of foreign liabilities  and suppose that RS is a reasonable estimate of their
future average service.  This coincidence with the discount rate requires that returns on foreign
investments adjust quickly to market conditions, as in the case of equity investments, floating-rate
debt, or rolled-over short-term debt.  Under those assumptions, a  solvency-based
24  For the role of fiscal problems in the previous episode, see Montiel (1993).
25 This was the case in Chile during the early 1980s.
30creditworthiness index can be constructed as the ratio of the existing stock of foreign liabilities to
the present value of resources, or:
C = a(R - g)S/T,  (4)
where a is an arbitrary constant to base the index.  An increase in this index has adverse
implications for creditworthiness, and thus for the sustainability of external finance. The
interpretation of C is as follows: as of any given date, the index C, represents the ratio of the stock
of external liabilities outstanding at that date to the projected present value of the resources
available to service those liabilities  from that date forward, expressed relative to the same ratio
during the base period.  Thus C measures creditworthiness in relative terms.
A simple alternative index could be based on the extent to which current capacity to pay
meets short-term obligations, gauged by a liquidity-based ratio such as:
CL = a'R S/T,  (5)
where R is now a short-term interest rate.  While this index lacks the theoretical foundation of C,
it provides an interesting benchmark.  An even simpler alternative can be constructed by
expanding the conventional debt-export ratio to include all external liabilities  and all traded goods
production:
CD = a"S/T.  (6)
In  Chart  3  a the creditworthiness index C is calculated and contrasted with both the
liquidity-based index CL and the more traditional CD 26. The chart contains historical values of the
indexes as well as projected values based on the interest rate projections presented in Chart  2
together with projections of T based on historical growth rates of foreign trade during the surge
period.  In Chart 3a the current value of S is maintained throughout the projection period.
Therefore these indexes refer to the sustainability of the existing stock of liabilities,  with  zero
capital inflows.
We note four main points  from  Chart 3a.  First, the creditworthiness index is very
26 To implement these calculations, we require a measure of the share of traded goods
production in GDP.  Lacking such a measure, we have proxied it by the standard indicator of
openness -- the ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP.  An alterative justification
for our measure is that the traditional measure based on observed exports is very sensitive to
the endogenous effect of the inflows themselves through their effect on real exchange rates,
and may therefore be a distorted indicator of the underlying repayment capacity.  The opposite
bias would obtain in the case of an import-based measure.  Exports plus imports, the measure
chosen in this study, is significantly more robust.
31sensitive to the evolution of interest rates. The path of C tracks fairly closely that of market
interest rates in Chart 2.  Second, creditworthiness actually improved according to our preferred
measure even as capital flowed into developing countries until end-l 993, contrary to what the
more traditional index would suggest.  In that sense, this more refined index can better explain the
surge in inflows.  Third, creditworthiness as defined here declines in 1994 and continues to do so
in the projection period.  Fourth, in spite of this, the index remains below its 1990 value
throughout the projection period.  Essentially, this reflects the fact that growth in T offsets
projected increases in interest rates.  We interpret this evidence as indicating that, if traded goods
output grows at its estimated historic rate and market interest rates move as projected, the
sustainability of the existing level of external liabilities  will not be impaired by creditworthiness
considerations, in the sense that the creditworthiness  index does not surpass values that were
previously compatible with substantial capital inflows. This suggests that creditworthiness
considerations associated with rising market interest rates need not imply pressures for a reversal
of capital flows and crisis. 2 7
But can the inflow continue under such circumstances at rates comparable to those
recently observed"  To answer this question, Chart 3b reports  an alternative measure of the index
that  incorporates growth in the stock of external liabilities S at the average rate observed during
the recent "surge" episode.  These indexes thus assess whether creditworthiness would be
impaired if inflow levels were to be sustained at levels on the order of those observed in recent
years.
Under these circumstances, the index deteriorates over the projection period, but remains
below its 1990 level by the year 2000.  The implication is that considerations of country
creditworthiness are unlikely to be driven by external events in a way that will constrain inflows in
the near term. 28  This analysis suggests that, for most countries, the risk of an extreme form of
hard landing lies in domestic shocks rather than in systemic factors.
C. Stocks and flows
Even if, as these results indicate, rising market interest rates do not necessarily portend a
deterioration in C to critical levels, they do imply an increase in R in equation (1), which itself has
implications for the vector of flows F.  These implications depend in an important way on  how
27 Note that we are assuming that the growth rate of T is unaffected by changes in
interest rates.  This is a strong assumption, and to the extent that it fails to hold the
conclusions may be excessively optimistic.
28 This does not imply, however,  that portfolio considerations operating through the
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33existing stocks S  enter equation (1).  We refer to a situation in which S enters (1) through the
function C or W as one of stock adjustment, and refer to the alternative, in which all adjustment
occurs through flows, as flow adjustment.
To the extent that S enters C or W, even if the new inflows were purely a function of
permanently improved domestic policies, it is unlikely that the magnitude of the initial flows
would be sustained.  The reason is that initial inflows would cause cumulative changes in stocks
that would diminish the incentives for new inflows (by reducing C and/or increasing W), thus
leaving the inflows as a one-time event to some extent. 29 For example, in the extreme case where
stocks are important for portfolio balancing reasons and country-risk adjusted domestic returns
are constant (F enters equation (1) only on the right-hand side), after the initial stock adjustment
of foreign investors' portfolios is completed, subsequent inflows would represent only the share of
new saving devoted to the acquisition of developing-country assets -- i.e., their magnitude would
be limited by the rate of growth of foreign investors' overall portfolios.
If stocks are important, the question of sustainability  becomes not one of whether inflows
will continue at their current magnitudes, but rather how they can be expected to decrease under
plausible scenarios.  The answer depends both on the permanence of the changes in the variables
driving the inflows as well as on how much of the observed inflow in each country reflects an
initial stock adjustment.  Given the projected increase in international interest rates, ceteris
paribus capital inflow levels can be expected to decrease for developing countries as a group,
continuing their estimated reduction during 1994. Nonetheless, in countries where inflows have
primarily resulted from an improved domestic economic environment that is expected to be
maintained, there is no reason for the bulk of the stock adjustment to be reversed, even when
extemal conditions change.  Thus, while flows may taper off in such a case, reflecting both the
completion of the initial stock adjustment as well as the change in external circumstances, a crisis
is not likely.  If instead the country in question is one for which the contribution of domestic
factors has been relatively minor, or even negative, and inflows have thus primarily reflected
lower foreign interest rates, the stock adjustment can be expected to be reversed if and when
foreign assets become more attractive.
So far, the only evidence on the empirical role of stock adjustment in the current inflow
episode has been provided by Fernandez-Arias (1994), who found no evidence that flows
responded to accumulated stocks.  The importance of this issue for the prospective magnitude of
post-surge inflows and the likelihood of crisis warrants more research on the topic.
D. Speed of adjustment
The third and  final component of the sustainability issue concerns the speed with which a
desired stock reversal can be effected by external creditors.  In equation (1) adjustments are
29  See Fernandez-Arias (1994) for a formal analysis of the relative importance of
flow-stock adjustment and the dynamics involved under expansion and contraction.
34assumed to be costless and therefore instantaneous, but in practice the speed of adjustment
depends on the ease with which such creditors can liquidate their positions.  In this regard, the
current inflow episode differs from the previous one.  On the one hand, the  bonds and equities
acquired by external creditors in the current episode are more easily liquidated than syndicated
bank loans.  Even FDI can effectively be liquidated by borrowing domestically and transferring
the funds abroad, particularly in a context where outflows have been liberalized, as has been
common in debtor countries during recent  years.  On the other hand, the assets acquired by
external creditors in the present instance are in many cases denominated in domestic currency.
This characteristic enhances liquidity while rendering the foreign-currency value of such assets
susceptible to capital taxation through their exposure to devaluation. With assets that are
relatively liquid and denominated in domestic currency, portfolio adjustments are likely to be
effected rapidly in response to new information.
VI.  Policy Responses
Up to this point, we have considered possible grounds for policy intervention in response
to the receipt of capital flows, but not the nature of the policy response itself  In this section we
review the policy options, and link suggested policy responses to the grounds for policy
intervention.
The question of appropriate policy response has received substantial attention, and the
menu of policies considered in this regard has thus been extensive. The desire to counteract the
pressures for exchange rate appreciation in the face of substantial net capital inflows has typically
led to very active Central Bank intervention and rapid increases in international reserves.  Policies
motivated by the desire to ameliorate this impact of  capital inflows on the external component of
high-powered money include:
a.  Direct intervention to reduce gross inflows, in the form of  the imposition of controls or taxes
on capital imports.
b.  The removal of restrictions on capital outflows, to reduce net inflows.
c.  Trade liberalization, intended to switch expenditure from domestic to foreign goods and thus
increase the trade deficit.
d.  Increased exchange-rate flexibility. In this case, the central bank fails to satisfy all of the
demand for high- powered money created by capital inflows, allowing some of  that demand
to be reflected in an appreciation of the domestic  currency.
An alternative approach is to accept some increase in the external component of the monetary
base, but to counteract the potential effects of such an increase on domestic aggregate demand by
using the conventional tools of macroeconomic policy. These include:
35e.  Restrictive monetary policy, in the form of sterilized intervention, or increases in marginal
reserve requirements:
f. Tight fiscal policy:.
Policies (a)-(c) are aimed to reducing net inflows and therefore, to the extent that they are
successful, if inflows have an external cause they can be seen as general-purpose policies that
attempt to reduce the size of the shock disturbing the economy.  It is worth noting that, in
practice, the rest of the policies are likely to have feedback effects on the level of net inflows.
Increased exchange-rate flexibility  would reduce outflows in the form of additional reserves, thus
reducing inflows. Likewise, tight fiscal policy would tend to reduce inflows by easing pressures
on domestic interest rates and the trade deficit. On the other hand, restrictive monetary policy
would tend to increase inflows.  Similarly,  while only policv (a) is specifically targeted to affecting
the level of gross capital inflows themselves, in practice all of the remaining policies  are likely to
have feedback effects on the level of gross inflows. Both capital-outflow and trade liberalizations
may induce additional inflows, as would restrictive monetary policy.  On the other hand, increased
exchange-rate flexibility  and tight fiscal policy may induce less inflows.
No consensus has emerged in the literature concerning the nature of the appropriate policy
response.  CLR evaluated a subset of these policies. They questioned (a) on the grounds that the
private sector can probably circumvent taxes on capital inflows, and rejected sterilized monetary
intervention (d) because it creates quasi-fiscal problems, while possibly perpetuating the inflow.
They were not disposed to advocate tight fiscal policy (h), on the argument that such policy
should depend on medium-term considerations.  Their analysis led them to advocate giving more
flexibility to exchange rates (f), and imposing higher reserve requirements (e). 32 The policies
advocated in Schadler et. al. (1993) only partially coincide with this prescription.  The latter study
advocated the avoidance of capital controls (perceived to be ineffectual) as well as of sterilization
(perceived as prolonging the conditions that foster the inflows in the first place and to have fiscal
costs), together with the acceptance of some real exchange appreciation, preferably by adjusting
3  Unsterilized intervention is not included here as a policy response option, because it
represents the status quo, and thus reflects a passive policy stance.
31  Notice that all of the above can be interpreted as policy responses to an external
financial shock.  In response to a capital inflow induced by an "incredible" stabilization (a
domestic shock), CLR (1992) consider the adoption of trade policy specifically geared to
stemming capital inflows (a temporary export subsidy-cum-import tariff).
12  The feasibility of the trade policy package alluded to in the previous footnote as a
response to inflows caused by an "incredible" stabilization was questioned by CLR because it
relies for success on the credibility of its temporariness, something that cannot typically be
assumed.
36the nominal exchange rate, rather than the domestic price level. However, the adoption of tighter
fiscal policy was also recommended.
Our own evaluation of the nature of the appropriate policy response ties that response to
the grounds for policy intervention as well as to country characteristics. We take up separately
the issues of micro distortions and macro instability, and in the case of the former, distinguish
between situations in which the effects of distortions are aggravated by inflows and those in which
changes in distortions themselves prompt the inflows.
A.  Microeconomic distortions worsened by exogenous changes in capital innlows
Consider first the case in which new capital inflows triggered by exogenous events
aggravate the negative welfare consequences of a pre-existing domestic distortion.  That is the
case of microeconomic factors (a)-(c) considered in Section III.  In this case, a first-best policy
response is, of course,  to remove the distortion and absorb the capital inflow.  Consider,  for
example, the case of improperly-priced government deposit insurance (microeconomic factor
(b) in Section III).  One way to remove this distortion,  of course,  is to eliminate such
insurance.  However,  it may be impossible for the government to do so credibly.  In that
case, the indicated solution is to price it properly, in order to avoid subsidizing excessive risk-
taking (financed by both foreign and domestic deposits) on the part of depository institutions.
The prescription  to remove the distortion would have been the indicated policy even without
the inflow, so the receipt of a capital inflow does not affect the policy prescription.  However,
if the first-best policy is precluded, then direct intervention in the form of capital controls or
taxation to reduce the inflow -- if feasible -- emerges as a possible second-best policy (policy
response (a)).  In this case, there is no hope that such a policy will deliver a first-best
outcome,  because it would not be directly acting at the source of the distortion.
Another important distortion mentioned previously emanates from the imperfect
enforceability  of  cross-border contracts underlying country risk (microeconomic factor (a)
above).  An increase in foreign liabilities makes  capital rationinsg  and debt crises more likely.
The increase in the probability of such events associated with an incremental addition to
foreign borrowing represents a cost  which is external to individual domestic private agents
undertaking the borrowing.  Such an agent would thus have an incentive to attract too much
foreign capital. 33 In this case the distortion cannot be removed to any substantial extent,  which
again leads to a second-best approach to the problem.  If  an excessive level of foreign
indebtedness is directly caused by this distortion,  a Pigouvian tax on capital intlows or
equivalent capital control,  if feasible, may yield the required lower level of capital inflows and
33 This situation appears more relevant in countries which are close to their foreign
capital carrying capacity.  However, on the other hand,  to the extent that private agents do not
fully benefit from country default,  increasing country risk discourages borrowing abroad.
37achieve the first best outcome,  since in this case the policy acts directly on the source of the
distortion (policy response (a)).
B.  Inflows induced by changes in microeconomic distortions
In the preceding analysis, the welfare consequence of previously existing distortions
were aggravated by capital inflows arising from unrelated causes.  As suggested previously,
however,  excessive capital inflows can be induced by  changes in microeconomic distortions,
either in the form of the introduction of new distortions or the removal of old ones. Examples
of the former were listed above.  The latter may  take the form,  for example, of the removal
of constraints on inflows.  When inflows are triggered by the introduction of new distortions,
the obvious first-best policy response is to remove the distortions. 34 The domestic distortions
most frequently  mentioned in the role of attracting capital inflows are "incredible" trade
liberalizations and price stabilizations (microeconomic factor (d) in Section III).  The solution
to this  type of distortion depends on the source of the absence of credibility.  If it arises from
the failure to set policy fundamentals (typically the fiscal deficit) on a sustainable path, the
solution is, of course,  to carry out the adjustments in the fundamentals required to attain
credibility.  If, on the other hand,  such adjustments have been completed and credibility
remains elusive, then direct intervention in the form of capital controls may again represent a
second-best  alternative.3
On the other hand, capital inflows can also be caused by the removal of distortions or
constraints.  Potential microeconomic examples are the lifting of capital controls and the
removal of barriers to direct foreign investment in developing countries, as well as measures to
enhance access to creditor-country financial markets.  It is also possible to think of the
adoption of a comprehensive package of credible stabilization policies accompanied by
liberalizing policy reforms as the comprehensive removal of widespread distortions.  To the
extent that such policies restore a country's  creditworthiness,  for example, they have the effect
of removing a prospective tax on its creditors.
In the absence of additional distortions, such removal of distortions constraining capital
inflows would move the economy to a non-distorted Pareto optimum and would therefore
improve welfare.  In general, of course, a capital inflow associated with the welfare-enhancing
removal of distortions, whether in specific markets or as part of a generalized package of
policy reforms,  does not call for countervailing policies on microeconomic grounds.  If other
distortions are present, however,  the ambiguity of second-best theory applies.  A preexisting
34 This point is made by Corbo and Hernandez (1993).
3  There is an obvious analogy here with the use of wage and price controls in heterodox
stabilization programs, when adjustment in the fundamentals is complete but lack of credibility or
inherent wage-price inertia threatens to derail the stabilization program.
38distortion may be part of a second-best policy package, and removing it may actually result in
a reduction in welfare when capital flows in.  For example, as noted above capital controls or
taxes on external borrowing may be optimal in the presence of borrowing externalities arising
from country risk considerations.  In this case. removing the policy "distortion" would induce
capital inflows associated with overborrowing and thus produce an inferior welfare outcome.
In such cases the correct policy stance is to retain controls.
In summary, then, if capital inflows are induced by changes in distortions,  from a
microeconomic perspective the change should be reversed if it is welfare-reducing, and
sustained if it is welfare-enhancing.  The association of a capital inflow with the change is not
relevant to the optimality issue.  If the inflow creates a macroeconomic problem, on the other
hand, then the policy tools of choice are macroeconomic in nature.
C.  Capital inflows and macroeconomic equilibrium
This leaves the issue of macroeconomic instability -- i.e.,  the question of how to use
policy to preserve the macroeconomic equilibrium in the face of a foreign real interest rate
shock.  The first point to make in this regard is that, from the standpoint of macroeconomic
policy goals, it may prove optimal to leave policy unchanged.  The effect of the shock will
typically be expansionary. 36 To the extent that the domestic economy requires aggregate
demand stimulus, the expansionary shock may be welcome.  The difficulty arises in the case of
an economy operating at full capacity and which seeks to preserve price stability.  What are
the policy options in this case?
First it is worth noting that, in the absence of any policy response, the magnitude of the
effect of a given fall in foreign real interest rates on domestic aggregate demand is likely to
depend on whether the reduction is widely perceived to be temporary  or permanent -- i.e.,
whether a decrease in short-term rates is matched by one in long-term rates.  The reason is that
the capitalization of future income streams will depend primarily on whether long-term rates
fall.  A temporary reduction in foreign short-term rates may be associated with a capital
inflow, but such an inflow is likely to be short-lived and perceived as such, with little effect on
domestic demand conditions and thus no need for stabilizing policy response.
If the change is perceived as permanent, the full panoply of policy options (a) through
(f) described at the beginning of this section is potentially relevant.  The most direct option is
to attempt to limit the size of net inflows arising from portfolio reallocations.  To this end,
controls on gross inflows could be introduced, in the form of ceilings or taxes, explicit or
implicit, on foreign borrowing and/or on foreign direct investment (a).  As already mentioned,
3  This may not be true when the recipient country operates a freely flexible exchange-
rate regime, as discussed below,  but few of the countries that have been the destinations of the
recent surge in capital inflows fit this description.
39it has been argued that this is not a feasible policy because these limitations are always
circumvented.  While it can be argued that even then the policy may be effective as long as tax
avoidance is costly, its social cost resulting from inefficient financial intermediation may
disqualify this policy.
More importantly. however,  while capital controls could conceivably be a first-best
solution if they respond to a microeconomic distortion directly inducing the capital inflows, or
a second-best policy in circumstances such as those described previously, capital controls are
hard to justify in other cases.  If the problem is macroeconomic in nature, the imposition of
effective capital controls implies introducing a microeconomic distortion.  Macroeconomic
stability may be preserved, but the costs of the distortion would remain.  It would clearly be
preferable to maintain stability without introducing a distortion by relying on more traditional
tools of stabilization policy . As in the case of microeconomic distortions described
previously, justification  for capital controls in this case would require a second-best argument
based  on the ineffectiveness of such tools (and relative effectiveness of controls),  or on high
costs of  employing them. relative to the costs of the distortions introduced by controls.
Alternatively,  gross outflows could be promoted by pursuing capital outflow
liberalization (b).  Assuming no other distortions, however, the latter would be desirable even
in the absence of a foreign financial shock.  Moreover,  the argument that it is not feasible to
impose controls applies to this case too, and implies that outflows are already defacto
liberalized.  But if effective, outflow liberalization may be actually counterproductive.  The
reason is that since limitations to capital repatriation are a concern to foreign investors, their
removal  is equivalent to the removal of a tax on foreign investment.  Consequently,  it will lead
to increased gross inflows, which may more than offset the direct effect on increased gross
outflows.  Current account liberalization (g), on the other hand, may not cause the balance of
payments to deteriorate (see Ostry (198_), and consequently may not be effective in relieving
the upward pressure on the monetary base emanating from capital inflows.
If the net inflow is not prevented from materializing through means such as these, a
case can be made for undertaking a stabilizing macroeconomic policy response.  However,
both the form of the transmission of the foreign financial shock to domestic aggregate demand
-- and  thus the  nature  of the  macroeconomic  problem  created  by  the shock  -- as well  as the set
of feasible macroeconomic policy responses, are likely to differ from country to country.
A key factor is the exchange rate regime.  Under fixed exchange rates, an autonomous
capital inflow resulting from a reduction in foreign interest rates leads to inflation and lower
real domestic interest rates under a passive monetary policy limited to unsterilized
intervention.  To avoid this outcome,  the authorities could switch to sterilized intervention (d).
This has the appeal of supplying foreigners with the domestic interest-bearing assets that they
40demand while adhering to a domestic money supply target for stabilization purposes.  7
Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, sterilization does not necessarily imply the
perpetuation of the inflow, since the inflow will end once portfolio composition has adjusted to
accommodate rate-of-return differentials. 3 "
Sterilization,  however, is not a panacea.  Though it may not imply the perpetuation of
the inflows forever,  it will tend to magnify the size of the cumulative inflow. Moreover,  it
may not succeed in insulating the domestic economy.  If domestic financial assets are regarded
as  imperfect substitutes by foreign investors, and if the instrument used to sterilize is not that
which foreign investors seek to acquire. then domestic portfolio equilibrium will require an
adjustment in relative rates of return among domestic assets.  Even if it insulates successfully,
sterilization cannot be a permanent solution, since as long as the inflow persists the central
bank will be exchanging high-yielding domestic assets for low-yielding foreign ones, and this
policy may have important fiscal implications. 39 Finally,  sterilization may turn out to be
impossible even in the short run if capital mobility is sufficiently high.
Alternatively,  a tighter monetary policy could be pursued through increasing minimum
reserve requirements or imposing special requirements on foreign deposits (e).4" These amount
to a tax on foreign borrowing by the banking system, which like other taxes to capital inflows
may be difficult to implement.  A specific problem with this approach is that it is likely to
simply have the effect of redirecting the capital inflow to domestic borrowers through other
channels than the domestic banking system -- e.g.,  through markets for equity and real estate.
If this disintermediation is effective, the macroeconomic stabilization problem would remain.
The scope for circumventing the domestic banking system depends on the menu of domestic
assets available to foreigners, and thus on the degree of sophistication of the domestic financial
system.
Thus,  if the fixed exchange rate regime is maintained, sterilized intervention and/or
increases in reserve requirements may provide a temporary solution to the macro stabilization
problem created by the foreign interest rate shock.  However, because it depends on the degree
37  Reisen (1993) has been a forceful advocate of this policy.
3"  This is an implication of simple portfolio models.
39  To finance the quasi-fiscal deficit that arises from such asset swaps would require a
permanent transfer to the central bank from the government,  which is passed on to foreigners
in the form of returns that are elevated relative to what they could earn at home.  Even if
fiscally feasible,  such a policy is unlikely to prove palatable for very long.
40  Other monetary measures cited by BK are shifting government deposits from
commercial banks to the central bank, raising interest rates on central bank assets and
liabilities, and curtailing access to rediscount facilities.
41of capital mobility, the structure of the domestic financial system,  and the scope for fiscal
adjustment to accommodate larger quasi-fiscal deficits,  the feasibility of this strategy is likely
to be country-specific.
Under flexible exchange rates (f), the foreign interest rate shock will result in an
appreciation of the domestic currency, and possibly a small decrease in domestic interest
rates. 4"  Under this regime, the external interest rate shock may well prove to be
contractionary,  as expenditure switching adversely affects the demand for home goods.
Stability in this case would require a monetary expansion, resulting in a combination of
domestic interest rates that are lower than they would have been without the shock, but higher
than under fixed exchange rates and a passive monetary policy,  as well as an exchange rate
which is appreciated relative to what it would have been without the shock, but depreciated
relative to what it would have been without monetary expansion.
This outcome is the basis for the policy advice proffered by both by CLR and Schadler
et. al. (1993) advocating a role for exchange rate appreciation in adjusting to the external
interest rate shock.  Again,  however, this advice may not be universally applicable.  Countries
that rely on the exchange rate as a nominal anchor will be reluctant to move the rate for fear of
eroding the credibility  of the peg.  In addition, the degree of real appreciation may exceed that
which would occur with a fixed peg, and thus this policy may have harmful effects for
competitiveness.  If these constraints are binding,  the monetary policy options available are
those outlined previously.
These considerations suggest that policy may need to be prepared to accommodate a
reduction in domestic interest rates with an unchanged nominal peg. If so, the set of remaining
policy options is narrow indeed. To preserve macroeconomic stability under such
circumstances, the induced increase in private absorption would have to be offset through
tighter fiscal policy (h).
VII.  Summary and Conclusions
The current capital-inflow episode represents a sharp break from the experience of the
debt crisis years for the developing countries currently receiving such inflows.  The magnitude
of flows nearly matches that which preceded  the debt crisis.  While this constitutes a welcome
relief from the constraints of credit rationing for many countries,  it also  poses structural and
macroeconomic policy challenges.  The structural challenge is to ensure that the resource
inflow is efficiently used in order to avoid a repetition of the debt crisis.  While certain
characteristics of the current inflows are reassuring in this regard,  the potential roles of a
variety of distortions implies that a  laissez-faire stance is not necessarily warranted.
4  The latter would result, with a fixed money supply, from the price-level effects of a
nominal appreciation.
42Moreover,  though capital inflows may represent the outcome of a favorable external shock
from the perspective of indebted developing countries, their implications for macro stability
may call for a policy response on these grounds as well.
After reviewing the characteristics of the new inflows, we have surveyed the
perspectives of the existing literature on the causes of the new inflows, and have separately
taken up the issue of sustainabilty and optimal policy response as well.  Our conclusions can
be summarized as follows:
First,  regarding the forces driving the current episode:
a.  In the aggregate, the role of foreign interest rates as a "push" factor driving capital inflows
and determining their magnitude appears to be well established.  Casual observation of timing,
the receipt of inflows by countries that had not undertaken major programs of stabilization and
liberalization,  as well as all the systematic empirical work support this conclusion.
b.  On the other hand, theoretical considerations suggest that country creditworthiness must
undoubtedly have played an important role in determining both the timing and geographic
destination of the new capital flows.  The role of the Brady plan in Latin America,  and the
relative absence of flows to Sub-Saharan Africa both support this view.
However,  we know little about the relative weights to be attached to domestic and foreign
factors in attracting capital to individual countries, and consequently even less about the role of
specific types of domestic shocks.  The existing evidence also sheds little light on the roles of
domestic or external structural factors. As indicated here, this type of information is crucial for
the design of policies.  More country-specific information is required about the possible role of
domestic microeconomic distortions in motivating these inflows or in channeling them to the
final borrowing sector.
Second, concerning sustainability, what has just been said makes it clear that
sustainability has an important endogenous component.  The loss of creditworthiness  due to a
deterioration  of the domestic policy stance is sufficient to stop inflows quickly, and given the
nature of stock adjustment, the liquidity of the assets acquired by external creditors, and their
vulnerability to exchange-rate changes,  inflows are likely to be replaced by substantial
outflows or an outright balance of payments crisis.  Recent events in Mexico provide strong
support for this assertion. Even  if creditworthiness is retained, however,  the early level of
inflows is unlikely to be sustained.  This is because the nature of stock adjustment would make
the level of inflows diminish over time even with stable external financial conditions, but even
more so because the favorable foreign financial shock that triggered the episode is expected by
the market to be temporary.  Whether the outcome is a gradual reduction in flows  to countries
that have been receiving them since the early nineties or an actual reversal depends on the path
to be followed by foreign interest rates as well as on the role of stock adjustment.  The key
43gap in knowledge here is  how large the temporary  stock adjustment component of the recent
inflows has been, relative to the "permanent" flow component.
Finally, what are the implications for policy in the recipient countries'?
a.  The receipt of capital inflows may strengthen the case for the removal of certain previously
existing microeconomic distortions, either because they aggravate the costs of such distortions
or because they ease the perceived constraints (typically balance of payments constraints) that
originally motivated their adoption.
b.  Direct intervention with capital inflows may not be feasible, because controls may be easily
evaded.  The feasibility of controls is likely to be country-specific.  If feasible, a case for
direct  intervention as a first-best policy can be made only  when the negative welfare
consequences of a distortion that cannot be removed arise from induced external borrowing.
This is likely to apply in the context of country risk externalities, and may also apply in the
presence of "incredible" reformns. In both situations. however,  the indicated intervention is a
Pigouvian tax (or equivalent control), rather than a ban on capital inflows.  Beyond this, the
case for direct intervention would have to be made on the basis of second-best considerations,
either on microeconomic or macroeconomic grounds.
c.  To the extent that capital inflows are permitted to materialize, the desirability of foreign
exchange intervention depends on the requirements for macroeconomic stability.  Either
competitiveness considerations or use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the context
of a stabilization program may preclude nominal appreciation.  If not, then permitting a
(temporary) appreciation of the nominal exchange  rate by restricting the scale of foreign
exchange intervention will dampen and possibly reverse the expansionary effect of the foreign
interest rate shock on domestic aggregate demand, by appreciating the real exchange rate and
possibly raising the domestic interest rate.  This outcome will be desirable if domestic
macroeconomic conditions are such that policymakers seek to avoid stimulating aggregate
demand.
d.  Alternatively,  the authorities can seek to avoid aggregate demand stimulus with a fixed
exchange rate through sterilized foreign exchange intervention.  This policy is feasible,
however,  only if capital mobility is imperfect.  The higher the degree of capital mobility, the
larger will be the accumulation of reserves associated with a policy of sterilization.  This
policy has associated quasi-fiscal costs, since the central bank exchanges high-yielding
domestic assets for low-yielding reserves, and the magnitude of these costs will be greater the
higher the degree of capital mobility and the larger the gap between domestic and foreign rates
of return.  Moreover,  even if successful, this policy may not insulate the economy from the
expansionary effect of the foreign shock if substitution among domestic assets is imperfect and
the asset demanded by external creditors is not that used in intervention.
44e.  If  sterilization is incomplete, the implication of the inflow is an expansion in the monetary
base.  Monetary expansion can still be avoided  by a commensurate reduction in the money
multiplier achieved  through an  increase in reserve requirements.  In this case, quasi-fiscal
costs are avoided through implicit taxation of the banking  system.  The economic implications
of this tax will depend on how the tax burden is ultimately shared among the banks. their
depositors,  and their loan customers.  Whether such measures can avoid an increase in
aggregate demand depends on the structure of the domestic financial system, which determines
the scope for disintermediation.
f.  Finally,  if domestic monetary expansion is not avoided. or if an expansionary financial
stimulus is transmitted outside the banking system, the stabilization of aggregate demand  will
require a fiscal contraction.
The key message is that choices confront macroeconomic policyrnakers at each step in
this progression.  Not only the intended effect on aggregate demand, but also the feasibility
and relative  desirability of alternative macroeconomic policy packages to achieve that effect,
will be functions of country circumstances.  Relevant considerations include the economy's
level of capacity utilization, the identity of its nominal anchor, the sterilization tools available
to the central bank,  the degree of capital mobility, the financial health of domestic banks, the
sophistication of the financial system, and the flexibility of fiscal policy, among others.  In
view of the multiplicity of factors that  should in principle influence the response of
macroeconomic policies,  no single combination of policies is likely to be optimal in all cases.
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